




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
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
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JOINT PUB 1: A Solid Doctrinal Cornerstone of Jello Pudding?

A Monograph by

Major Michael T. Flynn

Military Intelligence





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School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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ABSTRACT

JOINT PUB 1: A SOLID DOCTRINAL CORNERSTONE OR JELLO PUDDING? by MAJ Minimal T. Flynn, USA, 38 pages.

This monograph examines Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces. It assesses if Joint Pub 1 is still a sound capstone manual which provides a common perspective for the continuing development of joint and service doctrine. The American experience in war has increasingly demanded joint action. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, joint doctrine has gained a greater measure of importance. For example, when Joint Pub 1 was published in November, 1991, General Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, stated that "joint warfare is team warfare." Joint Pub 1 is essentially his philosophy on joint warfare. He had the manual written to define a "common perspective" for all warfighting services when it comes to joint warfighting and the doctrine that guides it.

The monograph begins with an examination of the development of joint and service doctrine. Evidence includes an assessment of Joint Pub 1 and each warfighting service's "capstone" manuals. Additionally, an examination of the theorists who have had the greatest influence on today's US military doctrine is provided. This examination demonstrates that Carl von Clausewitz, and his seminal work, On War, has had the greatest influence on the joint and service capstone manuals that exist today. Along with the theorists another key influence of Joint Pub 1 has been the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The overall impact of this legislation has been very positive. It has created an atmosphere for further "jointness" in many areas, specifically doctrine.

The next section analyzes Joint Pub 1 using the feasability, acceptability, and suitability model as a framework. It addresses whether Joint Pub1 still provides a correct vision for development of additional joint doctrine. It assesses if it still provides the necessary flexibility given today's constrained environment which the Armed Forces must operate within. Lastly, it looks at whether or not there is a willingness in the services to accept certain costs based on some very uncertain endstates.

This monograph concludes that Joint Pub 1 represents General Colin Powell's philosophy. While this was a valid philosophy given the conditions that existed in 1991, it no longer represents the conditions we face in 1994 and beyond. The "Bottom Up Review," continued down-sizing, and an unknown threat, has changed the way we will need to prepare for future warfare. These conditions came into being after the publication of Joint Pub 1. Therefore, Joint Pub 1 should, as a minimum, be reassessed by the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili.

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Server Children, Joint Chiefs of Sinff, words in Joint PUB 1 that joint weather is been weather. I Joint weather in control to work regarder in everything from task force level operations to full scale war. This need demands a doctrinal mental that deals with fundamental issues of how best to coupley the military instrument of power to achieve national recently goals and objectives. Joint PUB 1 does, "Joint doctrine office a common pumposites from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for war."

Joint Pub 1 is meant to be "capatone" doctrine for inter-service operability. It is meant to guide the mind of future commenders. It is a tool, of which others are experience, intellect, common sense, and leadership abilities. Joint Pub 1's fundamentals were written with the intent of accompanying the future commender to the battlefield. However, it is not meant to restrict him to certain actions care he gets there. A joint force commender should not have to contemplate the other service's capatons doctrinal manuals to undenstand what his force's potential is. He should be able to base his operations on one fundamental foundation which has joint service acceptance.³

Whether doctains is based on Jessons from the past or on a vision of the finure, all of the services should have a common perspective to develop their own doctains.

Capatons doctains provides each service with this common perspective. From this perspective comes a biospaint for further development of the respective services. Those to fight, manuals. However, without the foundation set by common.

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The US today lates both a document of National Security Strategy and a National Michael Strategy force.

The last, of these critical documents before the military without a true "unional" freel points. Greenal Collectioned, france Chaleman of the John Chief of Staff, published John Pub I based on his experience and vision. He did this gives a Predictable and Department of Defense combinated on that set a course with constitute absorption. He also wrote John Pub I with a Congressional mandated down down which he termed the "bise force". However, much her changed since Staff Pub I was lested in November, 1991.

Control (Control (Con

This study will focus principly on Joint PUB 1. It will assess whether Joint Pub 1 is all a second capations research; i.e., one that provides a collé foractaine. It will assess the origins of joint and service doctaine. Additionally, there will be a interference of the origins of joint and service doctaine. Additionally, there will be a interference of the descript who have had the greatest impact on today's US reflictly doctaine. Along with these theoretic amplies key influence of Joint PUB 1 has been the Goldwater-Nichole Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1996; and therefore an assessment of its influence, whether positive or negative, will be provided. Finally, an analysis of Joint PUB 1 will be done to demonstrate its influence on service doctaint. This analysis will be done using the frankliky, acceptability, and sulfability model. It will address if Joint Pub 1 still provides a long term when for development of other joint and service doctains given today's constrained invitational, whether it still provides sufficient floribility for the myled of changes taking place; and whether it still demonstrates a willingness within the military to accept certain costs based on uncertain end-states.

DOCTRINAL ASSESSMENT

JOINT PUB 1

This next section examines the capstone doctrinal manuals in existence today. These include Joint Pub 1, The Army's Field Manual 100-5 (Operations), Air Force Manual 1-1, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, and the Navy's current ... From the Sea white paper as well as Admiral Kelso's Force 2001 guide to the US Navy. The Navy capstone manual is under development with publication planned for April, 1994. Due to the recent changeover in Chief of Naval Operations from Admiral Kelso to Admiral Boorda, publication may be further delayed.

The publication of doctrine is an absolutely vital part of the military education system. Doctrine provides each service with a common perspective with which to teach their members what their profession is all about. Each service's doctrine is essentially a blueprint which provides guidance for a future battlefield.

Formal US Military doctrine was first issued by the Army in 1891 with its manual, Infantry Drill Regulations. By 1905, the Army had produced the ancestor to today's Field Manual 100-5, Operations, with its publication of Field Service Regulations. Since 1905 a more systematic approach to writing field manuals has evolved. Since the publication of the 1905 Field Service Regulation changes in everything from tactics to technology have caused major shifts in service doctrine.

These shifts were caused by a transformation in thinking at the highest levels of the military hierarchy on how future wars would be fought. Joint Pub 1, for example, has been referred to as the capstone doctrine for all services when it comes to warfighting. It maintains that while it is "neither policy nor strategy, [Joint Pub 1] deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military [instrument of] power to achieve strategic ends." This manual is intended

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Fibral Public Contractions in November, 1990 has been expensed include Contraction of the Police Children's State Contraction patternsphy on public medical public to the Contraction of the Contraction of

To enterent the evolution of John devolues applies a ball examination of the evolute following World Way II. For example, in early 1946 a series of meetings postered between the Army and Novy to send to difference on joint town to resulting from the West. During one of these meetings, under a directive from the Joint Chieft, a joint operations profer toget convened at the Army and Novy Stuff College (to become the Nedman) War College in mid-46). This board studied and proposed devolues for joint operations based on become bested from World Way II in an official to replace existing pro-very Army-Newsy agreements. The first messal state out is draft was Joint Overseau Operations. This attends "envisaged some unity of command with an integrated, mi-vertice joint early, but failed to devolop this (concept) in any precise detail. "Almost immediately, the Air Force disagrant.

Between 1946 and 1950 arrangeous ideas and concepts continued to be presented as Joint doctrins. These were done principally by an Ad Hoc Constitute for Juint policies and procedures. Its arbeits was to revise the 1935 official of Joint action of the Army and Novy. "Given the differences in service visappoints that had to be reconciled, [the Ad Hoc Committee] made dow progress in hit colleges to dealer principles and procedures for the joint action of the armod forces." All of these discussions, are what we see happening in today's defense and reconciled. For factors, is 1956, Congress forced the services to unify that

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All of the constage, operations, and provides discussed above took place over a factory year period of these. Desired the these there were two angles was and according to their levels fire type operations in which the US Admery found the construct involved. By the latter past of the 1900's, Congress, by anticidating the Goldman-Michael Act, had formed another from of samples integration on the affine. Our of the series inspects of this legislation would be to inchesse on the development of joint depthies.

Can result of this joint doctrins has been the immence of Joint Pub 1 to every field grade afficer and above by the former Chaleman of the Joint Chief of Staff, General Colin Powell. ¹⁰ Joint Pub 1 represents a comprehensive discussion of his philosophy on joint weether. General Powell believes that "cooperation requires town players and the willingsom to share credit with all team members. *11 Histories, General Powell wrote Joint Pub 1 after the Both administration instead its base force review.

There were several randitions of the base force, excentially, however, it was a treasty-five parents reduction in US constantional forces by the end of fiscal year 1995. Following publication of Joint Pub 1, the Bush education produced in final randition of the Base Porce analysis in January, 1991. A the time there were based economic realities of current budgets that Congress was less than willing to approve for defense spending that brought about the Base Force. Joint Pub 1 was a chance for General Powell to reach practically every member of the service community with his saidance on how we will finit in future werfare. As one writer said. "The

What had I've I may also again by a American vary of various. This is where the blue of expenses docated being embeddency reasons in. As Coal van Characteric like his coal of coal, Co. Her rate us, "(as coalcolors) for principles and pulse subsets when the coalcolors are explicated as an appear and (action) for principles and pulse subsets when the coalcolors that are so more in a sitting being theory... could be brought to some east of coalcolors." With so many equitions existing today, this remains sound white. Service through the reasons require commons on coalcolors thing; singularly as an accepted theory of varyors "copation" joint docates. This commons that parameter had from the up down into the make. The greater the experience of feature the more receive members find a part of the larger joint town.

Therefore, docation, particularly expenses doctors, must achieve a commons.

Joint Pub 1 was written as a means to communicate the Chairman's vision. It claims to be a guide for joint action, based on concepts which are broad and require a leader's judgment in application. Joint Pub 1 fluther declares that since the military has in many cases fought as part of affinees and coelitions, it also guides the military's "multinational" offers as well.

14 Regardiest of who Joint Pub 1 was written for, it remains the accepted "capatone" document for all the services when it comes to joint worlighting. General Robert Riscord, former Communiter, Eighth US Anny Koros, highlights this point with a discussion in Joint Porce Quarterly. He first says that to achieve the full synergy of combat power, joint worlighting doctrine must be common to and easily understood by all services. "In the absence of commonly understood doctrine, it becomes extraordinarily difficult to plan of execute military operations."

The second secon

Personal published of Information Part Regulations in 1891 through the constant of the CPE-II Mercell 180-1, Americal decision has been at the Securities of the confidence of the Confidence of Americal Securities in Confidence of Americal Securities in Confidence of Americal Securities of the Confidence of Securities of Americal Securities of the Confidence of Americal Securities of the Confidence of Americal Securities of American Securities Securities Securities of American Securities S

Grant flor traff decody a sensible of additional organizational changes took phose. By the addition of the 1980s, "the problem of decodes development had all por limbs creases and yet an elder reconstitution took phose." This spectrospectration created the Confinent Army Commission (CONARC). CONARC) and the large additional decodes the Army Colombia (CONARC) and the large additional decodes the Army Colombia (CONARC) and the large additional decodes the Army to United States and the large additional decodes the Army to United States and the large additional decodes the Army to the Army to the Individual decodes the Army to the Army to the Individual decodes.

The Army, through tenderonal authory and approximational structure adopted in minutes, and expectation to character, makend strangy during the mid-fillier, ¹⁹ Still, the Army and hand according them this pointful decade of the 1950's due to a State of the second of the Army helding. The branching planning trading and second by any 1968.

State of the Day County helding "Indicating planning trading and for the property of the Army War College of the property in 1979 and by the end of the decade its graduates began to be a property in the county property. For justice, tongs to be a property in 1979 and by the end of the decade its graduates began to be a property in the appropriate interpretation of the county of the entangly of floaties. For justice, one group of efficient ultimately proportional many of the county see the entangly of floaties. States white entangly of floaties. Its proportional many of the county see the entangly of floaties. Its proportional many of the county see the entangly of floaties. Its proportional many of the county see the entangly of floaties. Its proportional many of the county see the entangly of many in the county see the entangly of many and I.

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Not well 1973 with the formation of Tabling and Doctrice Comment
(FRADOC) did the Army develop a systematic approach to developing decision
consign. Prior to this, even though there was an approach of a group, much of
it was fragional didd orbjets to conflicting processes. ²¹ Break with the formation
of TRADOC and this monly developed systematic approach, consense while the
Army would still be head to come by.

It was the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 which became the jumping off point for TRADOC to use doctrine as an agent for change. As a consequence, there was distiffence resistances to this offices from the field and from white the TRADOC contentity firstly standy Fort Leutenmorth. During this time, General D-Pay, Consequence of TRADOC, was not instructed in obtaining consequence after in TRADOC or with the field. He believed a radical departure was accounty. Accordingly, General Defrey work a scale of field street as consequence of accordingly. Content Defrey work a scale of field street as consequence and med the 1976 edition of FM 160-5 to effect the po²

This explains of PM 100-5 produced a regular of problem stranges. Since the publication of the 1975 califor, discounce exhibite layer trees produced. There has been the 1982 Although Bank manual and the 1985 and 1993 Operations.

Control (College College) and the college of the co

FM 100-5 says, "As the Amy's beyond decides, [it] describes here the Amy's fitting about the conduct of operations. FM 100-5 making helped all of the Amy's decided. ¹²⁴ The describing and compatibility of PM 100-5 to making another decides in its discussion is Chapter 4 of Julie Operations. It afficus that Amy decides is compatible with and supports joint decides as described in Julie. Publication 1-0.²³ In trust, FM 100-5 is the only experience service decided mount that has a full obspice decided to joint operations.

The other terrice measure discuss aspects of team weether, but a paster would be hardly record to facility specific references to fighting as a member of a joint or stabilities train. They also do not make any reference to their compatibility with the joint doctries continued in Joint Pub 1. PM 100-5 has demonstrated around concepts and in fully integrated with the ideas presented in Joint Pub 1. It provides the facilities to adopt to changes and the vessellity to accomplish the regard of mindous required in today's uncertain environment.

at Marie Michael annual Chief of Suef of the Afr Pency when in the arment to APA [14]. Therefore is important became it provides to framework for riling law to apply military power. Dodnied in what kindey has magic ns weeks in war, as well as what does not find, added, ^{als}. The history of december Expenses in the Air Force demonstrates a parachial existence to juice operations that all exists today. For example, after World War II, the Army Paid Manual 100-20, Command and Engloyment of Alt Power, recombined the produce of it power. However, in May, 1944, a Count Process Crimold. Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Operations, usged the Air Perce to formulate its over decision. He assessed that FM 100-20 was electron and explicity inscharges. As values his assessed complexized a co-regulity of air and ground power. However, Guagesi Columbia that differently. He believed that air and land power ware not alongs interdependent. The Air Porce was relieved to peak the idea that PM 100-20 model revision. This relations in turn object up a political country any both while the Air Perce, and between them and the Army; thereby hinduring the cross Carlotte Market 21

According to the 1946 edition of FAC100-20, "the chinges objective of its process is to finite the control of a district and the state applied development of the policy and the state of the national excessors."

A new group of all "and or "making its process of the Porce and with them came this philosophy for the fluore of all weather. This happy needed its own base of operation.

Therefore, a rest of Contine was contributed at the old Air Corps Tactical School in Passens City, Florids.

Let Remark 1946, Berner was an ability of The Secretary Control of Control of

A variety of easier and panel throughout took place over the east for your.

Benealthy, the Air Pope wanted to get a firm group on brook such as air follows.

Air Pope decision and freep structure. ** One example was the publication of APAR 1-1 in Agait, 1955. It decises that "these [firmed] which conduct in constitute and expedit of decisive result. ** This differed markedly from the Army's Polet Mound 100-5 which excitationed that Army forces as lead forces are the decisive component of the military structure. During the course of military operations the Army forces, because of their decisiveness, will be expected by other military components. In any case, the effects of all strates problems would be discould to read action of actions of the Air Povert position. In their US Novel Western Publication 10, they defined, "Air strategy, designed to each a decision primarily by the circles, is in the process of historic development and well become store closely definitely with the pagence of filters development and well become store closely definitely with the pagence of filters.

The translations decade of the 1950's brought about a revolutionary period of subliney shought. Desire the 1961-1962 these financians came the about of correspondences and the financia oppositely, of market to space. Because of the, the Africans

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The Viscous West degenerated to both Army and Air Perce landon, the literapes Ellip required between these two services. Following the West the Chief of Staff of both the Army and Air Perce, General Alexand and General Brown requirely, should a serviced recleate they and technols. They removed to have the contents recleateding personnel both requalentiess and be excited forward into personness operations. To do this they set about taying to indicate General Robert Diseas, on his very to taking command of the Air Perce Trackel Air Command (TAC), and General William DePuy, Commander of TRADOC. By the fall of 1973, both commanders agreed to exhibit a relationship that would mature from a fielegae ty a perfectioning.

This partnership personant during the early to mid-sighties. But the term pertnership may not be do appropriate term. It could be described more as a relationship that required material cooperation in order to require. With poor performance by all the anythes during the climate of Daniel Cooperation. Described, and the lack of linear stavide execution during the invasion of Greenship, Congress determined to deflect how the services would woult together. Operations Described Shield/Described in provided a described would woult together. Operations Described action.

Immediately following this operation came General Powell's philosophy on jointness in Joint Pub 1.

Four months later (March 1992), the Air Force published Air Force Manual 1-1, Volumes I and II. However, joint or jointness is not a word easy to come by in either of these manuals. Volume II contends "that aerospace power is the dominant factor in modern warfare." Although they acknowledge that this view remains controversial, "the ability to employ aerospace power rapidly against any level objective makes [the Air Force] the most versatile component of military power." It is these types of controversial statements which create inter-service rivalries. Another similar statement of this same "parochialism" is again found in Volume II. It states, "The inherent speed, range, and flexibility of aerospace power combine to make it the most versatile component of military power." 39

All this muscle flexing in doctrine may be nothing more than a push for more resources for their particular service. In a recent speech to the Air Force

Association, General McPeak presented still another very controversial attack on the roles and missions of other services:

"Until recently, stationing troops forward was the best, maybe even the only way to monitor events, to show the flag, to guarantee a rapid response...Air and space power now promises a more elegant solution to the presence requirement...[the solution, he said is]...If you're sitting in country 'Y' and you're holding a council of war, you've got to think about the 2nd Bomb Wing in Barksdale [Air Force Base in Louisiana] or the 509th Bomb Wing with its B-2s at Whiteman [Air Force Base] in Missouri as being less than a day away. That is presence."

This seems to be more like an attempt to justify the purchase of more B-2 bombers than a correct doctrine. If the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is truly the integrator of doctrine among the services, he should clearly identify the efficiencies which can be realized. Otherwise, comments such as the one above may guide us right back toward a service parochial atmosphere that we do not need. As General

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Traditionally a "blue water" acroice, the US Navy story began in 1794 when Congress "authorized the completion of such Signals, equationally, purchase, or remained administration waterships; and the creation of a Navy Department. " Many of their early albert wave spens supporting international condition. There types of quantities consisted of attractors such as consequents protection and consequence ratificat. Additionally, the Navy South open occurs savel organisms and provided control expects to amplificate open occurs of the Army and the Manine Cons.

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This seconds like an expension for the Navy to get single resources than the other sections, and it probably is. The Navy is purbing for a expension decisies that promotes their traditional operational capabilities. In the past they materials four

"traditional capabilities of forward deployment, crisis response, strategic deterrence, and scalift." In order to execute this new direction of the Navy-Marine Corps team, the Navy has added four additional capabilities. They are identified by the Navy as "four key operational capabilities [which] are required." They are command, control, and surveillance; battlespace dominance; power projection; and, force sustainment. Each of these has a major impact on resources as well as on joint warfighting.

Many of the concepts in both ... From the Sea and Force 2001 provide the reader with a joint image. The jointness however, is in terms of the Navy-Marine Corps team, not the full complement of all four services. The ... From the Sea concept paper emphasizes that the new direction of the Navy-Marine Corps team, both active and reserve, is to provide the nation with naval expeditionary forces tailored for national needs and shaped for joint operations, and to have those forces operating forward from the sea. 47

This discussion about the Naval Service's new role becomes expanded when one looks back upon their traditional expeditionary roles. For example, in the Naval Force policy document, ... From the Sea, it states that the design of Naval forces allows them to operate forward in austere environments and to respond swiftly if called upon. One of the five specific tasks is for the Navy-Marine team to operate without needing transit or overflight approval from foreign governments in order to reach the scene of action. He term transit means land forces and the term overflight means air forces. While this in fact may be the case in many instances, these types of statements only work against the whole concept of joint warfare. The Navy is simply arguing to keep aircraft carriers. The Chief of Naval Operations further contends, "as the Navy shifts from [the] Cold War...naval organizations must change. Responding to crises in the future will require greater flexibility and new ways of employing [Naval] forces. "49" These future crises will

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PLEET MARINE FORCE MANUAL 1 WARRIGHTING

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The Marine Corps has existed since almost the first military laws of the Continental Congress in 1775. 52 At the time, they supported the Navy with shipboard police, boarding and small landing parties, gun crews, and embassy guards. By the twentieth century, the Marines began providing police for restless underdeveloped areas of the world where there were American citizens, investments, and imperial interests. 53 It was the prospect of an island hopping campaign that gave the Marines a clear "raison d'etre" for existing. As early as 1906, members of the Marine Corps were advancing the idea of using the Marines for landing operations against islands to obtain and protect advance bases for the Navy.

In 1920, the Marines established a school of instruction at Quantico, Virginia where they began working the issue of advance base work. Then in 1921, Marine Corps Major Pete Ellis wrote a paper projecting the amphibious strategy of a Japanese-American war outlining the procedures for amphibious assault operations to acquire bases across the Pacific. With the acceptance of this concept, the Navy-Marine team continued to work "with civilian manufacturers to develop new types of landing craft and vehicles for amphibious warfare. The Marine Corps base at Quantico became the dynamic center for the evolving art of landing operations." The whole idea of ship to shore attacks seemed to offer a major military mission for which the Marines were particularly suited. Perhaps the prospect of an island hopping war against Japan might provide the Marines with a distinct reason for their continued existence. 35

By 1933, a Major General John Russell, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, was instrumental in establishing the Fleet Marine Force as the amphibious arm of the Corps. Additionally, with his blessing, the next year the Corps began concentrating their efforts on publishing a tactical manual, which was issued with the title Tentative Manual of Landing Operations (1934).⁵⁶ This manual became

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THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT

In On War, Carl von Clausewitz writes: "Given the nature of [war], we must remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on which the command can rely for support at any time." In war, good commanders find themselves falling back on their own innate qualities. This inner-self of the commander on the battlefield usually finds itself outside the model and, at times, in conflict with it. Capstone doctrine, therefore, must be presented with such consensus and flexibility as to allow a commander to use his talents and genius to operate outside the established rules of doctrine when these rules conflict with his learned practice.

Carl von Clausewitz gives the military much in the way of theoretical concepts. His ideas dominate each of the service's capstone manuals. Many of his theories are still sound practical concepts that can easily apply to today's environment. For example, Joint Pub 1 uses Clausewitz's elements of friction, chance, and uncertainty to characterize battle. In the discussion on the Nature of Modern Warfare, Joint Pub 1 asserts that "members of the US Armed Forces should understand the nature of warfare, both through solid grounding in the tested insights of the finest theorists...and by carefully keeping those insights up to date." This is clearly a mandate to the professional officer to continue studying theories of warfare. Since Clausewitz is the main centerpiece of joint doctrine today, he may have the greatest influence on future warfighters.

When today's leaders reach higher levels of responsibility and authority, problems tend to multiply. In war or operations other than war, things such as confusion, conflicting information, and the stress and pressure of command itself magnify these problems. "At this level," Clausewitz says, "almost all solutions must

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This Air Picture still debetes which theorist deminates its doctrine. Unlike the plat however, the current AFM 1-1 quotes Clausewitz go less than forty times. This again demonstrates the influence his theory of war has had on today's Air Ports. The development of Air Ports doctrine has come along in the years since Clausewitz versus. In:1915, General Billy Mitchell, at the time assigned to the War Deposits of General Staff, That theorized that Army evistion would be a valuable second line of defines if the Navy's flat line of defines should fail to stop an little of the United States. ** Reflect then looking back at the results of evision from World War I, he sended to look should at logical projections of air power capabilities. In his case position as Chief of Air Service's Training and Operations.

Group, General Mitchell gathered a group of veteran airmen together. They studied Mitchell's ideas and concluded that air action on land and air action on sea were clearly distinctive. 67

This assessment drew much criticism from the Navy. For example, at a meeting of the Navy's General Board in April, 1919, General Mitchell urged that aircraft could successfully attack naval warships. He believed that defense of the nation's coast be given to land-based aircraft, and urged the United States to organize some type of ministry of defense, combining the army, navy, and air forces under one unified direction.⁶⁸ The Navy disagreed with Mitchell's views on the role of air power and never again invited General Mitchell to speak before the Board.

During this time many in the military considered the First World War as an aberration. "Since the turn of the century American military planning had been geared to two dominant themes: Continental defense and protection of possessions in the Pacific." The former represented the traditional viewpoint, while the latter gained prominence after colonial expansion in 1898. For the Army, defense of the continent was its basic objective while the Navy became preoccupied with the Pacific. Alfred Thayer Mahan, who wrote *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, 1660-1783, became the principle military theorist who influenced the Navy at the time.

In his remarkable book, Mahan set forth his views on both sea power, and strategic analysis and theory. Essentially, he presents two themes. The first is that sea power is an indispensable ingredient for national greatness and the second is the recognition of the overriding importance of the political object that is achieved by naval warfare. Samuel Huntington, in his timeless work, The Common Defense, writes, "Mahan had constructed a doctrine of seapower without specifically denigrating landpower. For the supporters of airpower, however, the attack on the surface forces was unavoidable. Once the Air Force was established, the intensity

of their doctrinal concern perhaps moderated somewhat, but by this time the other service had felt compelled to reply in kind."

Mahan wrote his classic work before the turn of the twentieth century. The US Navy formed its first doctrinal headquarters on 1 October, 1993. The Navy had "doctrine" per se in terms of US Fleet Instructions. Yet, it took them nearly one-hundred years to establish a Naval Doctrine Command. In Admiral Kelso's *Porce 2001* philosophy, he states, "With a far greater emphasis on joint...operations, our Navy...will continue to provide unique capabilities of indispensable value in meeting future security challenges." One of the reasons for this sudden doctrinal enlightenment in the Navy is the influence of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. This abrupt realization of "jointness" has taken the Navy by surprise. On the other hand, the Marine Corps took quick measures to get their ideas out.

In FMFM 1, Warfighting, the Commandant of Marine Corps established the Corps' official doctrine. The manual defines doctrine as a "teaching advanced as the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of war, from its nature and theory to its preparation and conduct." The Marines' theory of war is based on Clausewitz. In Chapter two, The Theory of War, the manual emphasizes that the Marines theory of war will become the foundation for the way they prepare for and wage future warfare. In this chapter, Clausewitz is credited no less than fourteen times for assisting in the development of the Marine Corps' thoughts and concepts on a theory of war.

Carl von Clausewitz serves as the primary influence for both service and joint capstone doctrine. Although others exist such as Jomini, Brodie, and Corbett, his ageless classic, On War, is evident on many of the pages of Joint Pub 1 and the other service manuals. In identifying terms which are important to doctrine, Clausewitz classifies and defines two universally accepted ones; tactics and strategy. He does this to help the reader understand if one wants a theory of war that is valid

for the great majority of cases and not completely unsuitable for any, it must be based on the most prevalent means and their most significant effects.

Understanding this distinction between tactics and strategy is critical to understanding the cause and effect relationship found in joint and service doctrine. Universally accepted concepts and ideas in doctrine among the services are supposed to be in documents such as Joint Pub 1. However, since it was written in November, 1991, things such technology continue to rapidly change. Therefore, Joint Pub 1 may need to be rewritten or at least reassessed to its worth.

One of the greatest influences besides history and theory on Joint Pub 1 has been the United States Congress. In this next section, the monograph will examine the influence that the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 has had on doctrine. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was initially the results of two studies. The first was the Senste Armed Services Committee staff study of October, 1985 and the second was the Final Report to the President's Blue Ribbon Commission of Defense Management of June, 1986. Then on 1 October, 1986, Public Law 99-433, known as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was signed into law.

GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 represents the first major legislative change in the Department of Defense since 1958. In fact, there have been little substantive changes since the National Security Act of 1947. The 1986 Act was an ambitious attempt by Congress to fix many perceived problems within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commands, and the military departments. What brought on these dramatic attempts to change the Department of Defense was a dissatisfaction on the part of Congress and the country as a whole with the past performance of the military. The military's

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perochial. They became frustrated at having to continuously resolve disputes between the services. Therefore, Congress empowered the Chairman and the Joint Staff so that they would be able to settle disputes and unite the efforts of the unruly services. 80

Contained in the Goldwater-Nichols Act are six major provisions which are known as "Titles." Title II, Military Advice and Command Functions, deals with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands. Within Title II the Chairman assumes some additional responsibilities. Two of these are developing joint doctrine and submitting a report every three years to the Secretary of Defense on the roles and missions of the Armed Forces. ⁸¹ This latter requirement will be more difficult for the current Chairman simply because there is currently no National Security Strategy set by the Clinton Administration. This is in contrast to Chairman Powell who had a National Security and National Military Strategy developed by the Bush and Cheney administration.

This new direction in joint warfighting required by Congress established the publication of Joint Pub 1 in November, 1991. Chairman Powell wanted his thoughts presented on how future warfare will be fought and on his perceptions of what the future battlefield will look like. However, what Congress and Chairman Powell wanted and what they got have turned out much differently.

Joint Pub 1 was an effort to "serve as a unifying focus for [the military's] conduct of warfare." As such, it established basic military values, presents certain fundamentals, and identifies the nature of modern warfare and its consequences. It was written with a very strong Desert Shield/Desert Storm flavor. In the afterword of the document, it quotes nine senior officers' opinions about joint warfighting in the desert. Additionally, the manual uses four examples of joint operations throughout its' chapters. While the war in the desert was a tremendous display of

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ANALYSIS

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General Powell may not have foreseen the impact of the "Bottom Up Review." Therefore, his vision of the future of joint warfighting may be somewhat skewed. Since he had Joint Pub 1 published on the "Base Force" concept, the environment has changed. For example, force structure continues to be reduced while operations other than war continue to increase. However, the new Chairman along with the Joint Warfighting Center, which is responsible for developing joint doctrine, must see this period of time as an opportunity. The time may be now for the current Chairman to set a new vision. A vision that allows joint manuals still in draft and those yet to be published to set a course for joint warfare of the twenty-first century.

Acceptability

Acceptability is the cost-benefit relationship between joint doctrine and the services. It addresses the consequences of cost and whether or not they are justified based on the importance of the effects desired. If one of those consequences is a rise in competition between the services then the net effect may not be desired. For example, the application of air, land, and sea forces can have a resounding synergistic influence during a campaign if forces are employed as part

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provides an atmosphere of creative competition. As Stephen Rosen asys, "We should never lose sight of the fact that a little competition never hurt anyone. After all it was the principle that won the Cold War." The point is that today the United States needs fewer forces in being and a wider menu of potential military capabilities from which to choose. We need this precisely because the US does not know what the threat will be or how it will fight. Doctrine can greatly assist this refinement of future capabilities. However, before Congress or the White House reacts to public demands, the military, i.e., the Chairman and the service chiefs, should quickly consolidate their efforts. Joint Pub 1, if strongly worded and equally accepted by all the services, may achieve the desired effects.

Suitability

Joint Pub 1 was published and distributed to a large audience. Yet, it appears to have become an obscure document. General Powell had the best intentions, but the system for developing additional joint publications was not in place. This system for developing joint doctrine would take another two years to come into existence. Therefore, Joint Pub 1 became a nice document to have in one's professional library, but ends up having little relevance. Thus, will the attainment of Joint Pub 1's underlying philosophy of team warfare accomplish the desired effect for future joint warfighting?

As General Riscassi exclaimed in the summer of 1993, "In truth, we have not had, nor do we yet possess, a commonly agreed [to] doctrine for forming or fighting as part of a military [team]."91 Moving into the twenty-first century presents many uncertainties. Regardless of these uncertainties, it is clear that future warfare will require all the components of the joint military team. The risks and problems of coordinating all these elements can be reduced by creating flexible doctrine that is agreed to by all services. A way to do this is to set a concrete

foundation of doctrine. Currently, Joint Pub 1 does not go far enough in identifying the pieces of this foundation. It simply describes a "way of warfare."

According to General Carl Mundy, Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Marines "have significantly improved their joint interoperability in the last decade...[we] have also benefited from the effort to make service doctrine consistent with joint doctrine."

The Marines should know better than any other service the need to work as part of a joint team. Without the historical relationship between the Marines and the Navy, and the Marines own efforts to demonstrate service unique capabilities, they may have disappeared as a fighting force. Still, the Marines have not set a new doctrinal foundation since 1989. Even though this foundation took them successfully into Desert Shield/Desert Storm, it was written by former Commandant, General Gray in 1989. This doctrine greatly reflects his views based on the conditions and the environment during his tenure. From this we could draw the conclusion that Joint Pub 1 has not accomplished its desired effect in regards to the Marine Corps.

If attainment of jointness espoused in Joint Pub 1 is to come to fruition, the services must let rivalries take a back seat to teamwork. As General Gordon Sullivan writes, "within the context of joint operations, there is room for achieving economies of scale and consolidating functions." Consolidating doctrine may be one of the ways to achieve this end. If we say we will always fight as a joint team, which is the current wave of thought coming out of the Pentagon, consolidation of doctrine should be one of the places to start. Joint Pub 1 can easily set the tone for this kind of thinking.

While each service contributes to all major missions of the national military strategy, their contributions in the past have varied considerably. For instance, the Army, during the 1950's, defense of NATO was primary, closely followed by limited war functions. Defense of the Continental United States ranked third.

Trailing far behind, a poor step sister to the others, was strategic deterrence. The Air Force functional areas were in order, strategic deterrence, continental defense, NATO, and limited wars. The Navy's areas were limited wars, NATO, strategic defense, and finally, continental defense.⁹⁴ Although there are similar missions here, none of the services could agree on the same priority.

Joint Pub 1 does not identify one set of functional areas for all the services to focus on. This may be another aspect of what a cornerstone doctrine should provide to accomplish the desired effect. When all is said and done, for Joint Pub 1 to be suitable for accomplishing the desired effect, it must provide the linkage between the required end-state, the ways to get there, and whatever means are available given today's political environment. Joint Pub 1 provides the linkage between the national security and military strategies and all other doctrine. From this linkage, the other services can easily fall into a hierarchy of doctrine. Right now, one does not exist.

CONCLUSION

General Poweil has professed many times that the military needs people who have mastered the tools of modern warfare while maintaining their traditional fighting spirit. 95 With the future of the United States military heading toward the information age, we must be skilled in the use of bytes and bayonets alike. Joint Pub 1 gives a mere two short paragraphs to technology and the speed of communications. This is one area that may need to be expanded. For example, a discussion on the use of space based systems and their application to joint warfighting would be appropriate. Another would be to encourage the other services to seek better connectivity through information management systems. These types of concepts are fast becoming the wave of future warfare. While Joint

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IMPLICATIONS

Political controversy, that is, changes in administrations, changes in foreign policy, changes in the political environment (ware, treaty violations, trade beniens, conclose to beniens sights chance) is a major came for the preliferation of service doctrine. Each service has no purpose to exist other than to defend and protect some aspect of the political will. Even though the services have fought together during this entirety on a number of occasions, it has taken an act of Congress to force them to think as one fighting chapter.

Control of the Contro

The forms hatterial will include an area of operations, some measure of butting only, and much boild of organization. It lies Pob 1 most to recognize the three physical and incolorant concepts exist and attempt to define them. If I four Pob 1 is to remain much lead concluse to represent the three butting which is blacked as the butting about joint methods of thinking about joint methods of thinking about joint methods. Mentifying the framework of a fathers buttingly in only one complet. Although many of these elements of joint decisine will be found in subordinate manuals to Joint Pub 1, there etil remains a med to identify the orbital pieces of joint weefers.

Plusity, since Joint Pub I was written without the foresight of lighting two stojer regional contingencies almost significances), are its conteges all waid? As monthood above, its values and finalementals are still waid, but there say be too back. What if the US is heavily involved in "Operations Other Than War?" What if the two regional contingencies are coordinated by some like-minded enemier? Of these possible conditions, it is operations other than war which may involve the balk of the US Military. Situations such as military intervention in places like Peru or Colombin against drug cartely; sixts in US cities; or precedesping/percentaling

ENDNOTES

¹Joint Staff, Joint PUB 1 <u>Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces</u>. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1991. General Powell in his opening message states this point up front. It is also the "motto" on the front cover of the manual.

²Joint Pub 1, p. 6.

³Clausewitz, Carl von, On War. Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 141. These are Clausewitz's thoughts on theory not being doctrine, but existing so that "one need not start afresh each time sorting out [available] material...but will find it ready to hand and in good order."

⁴Joint Pub 1, p. iii. Joint Pub 1 states, "leaders must integrate the concepts and values presented in this publication into the operations of the US Armed Forces." The only way to accomplish this would be to begin integrating them into service doctrine, i.e., "capstone" manuals.

⁵Weigley, Russell F., <u>The American Way of War. A History of United States Strategy and Policy</u>. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973, p. 216.

⁶Joint Pub 1, p. 5.

⁷Futrell, Robert F., <u>Ideas. Concepts. Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1961-1984 (Volume I).</u> Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1989, pp. 373-374. The Air Force did not like the emphasis on amphibious landings of ground troops and the fact that there was no consideration that a hostile nation might be defeated by air attack. Therefore, they did not agree with this manual.

⁸Ibid, p. 378.

⁹Hereafter referred to as Goldwater-Nichols Act.

¹⁰Joint Pub 1, p. iii. It states, "To this end, Joint Pub 1 is being given exceptionally broad distribution." The result was, every field grade officer in all services was provided their own personal copy of this manual.

¹¹Joint Staff, Joint PUB 1 <u>Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces</u>. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1991, p. 15.

¹²Doughty, Robert A., Reforming Joint Doctrine. <u>Parameters</u>, Vol. 22, No. 3, Autumn 1992, p. 42.

13Clausowitz, p. 134.

14 Joint Pub 1, p. iii.

¹⁵Riscassi, Robert W. Principles for Coalition Warfare. <u>Joint Force Onarterly</u>, Washington, DC: National Defense University, Summer 93, p. 60.

¹⁶Sullivan, Gordon R., Projecting Strategic Land Combat Power. <u>Joint Force</u> <u>Quarterly</u> Washington, DC: National Defense University, Summer 93, p. 11.

¹⁷Cara..., Michael Major, FM 100-5: Just Meeting a Requirement? <u>Military</u> Review, August, 1992, p. 64.

18Ibid, p. 64.

¹⁹Futrell, Robert F., <u>Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States</u>
<u>Air Force 1961-1984 (Volume II).</u> Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air
University Press, 1989, p. 173.

20 Ibid.

²¹Cannon, Michael Major, FM 100-5: Just Meeting a Requirement? <u>Military</u> Review, August, 1992, p. 64

²²Herbert, Paul, "Deciding What Has To Be Done: General William E. Depy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations", Leavenworth Papers 16 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, July, 1988), p. 7.

²³Sullivan, p. 12.

²⁴United States Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Washington, DC: HGDA, 1993, p. v.

²⁵Ibid, p. 4-1.

²⁶United States Air Force, Air Force Manual 1-1 <u>Volume II Basic Aerospace</u>

<u>Doctrine of the United States Air Force.</u> Washington, DC: HQ, USAF. 1992, p. v.

²⁷Futrell, Volume I, p. 366.

²⁸Ibid, p. 365-366. This was written by a Major General David Schlatter in 1946

in Air Force Magazine.

²⁹Futrell, Volume I, p. 365. Futrell discusses the formation of the Air Force's Air War College, Command and Staff College, and the Air Tactical School. These schools were part of the Air Force's early efforts to identify Air Force doctrine.

³⁰Ibid, p. 367.

31 Ibid, p. 406.

32 Ibid, p. 406-407.

³³Ibid, p. 407. This is taken from Futrell's Volume study of the Air Force. However, Futrell takes this quote from an article in Air University Quarterly Review (Winter 1956-1957), written by a Colonel Wendell E. Carte, pp. 47-48.

³⁴Futrell, Robert F., <u>Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1961-1984 (Volume II)</u>, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1989, pp. 172-173.

35Tbid

³⁶Ibid. pp. 539-540. This partnership began to realize a number of efficiencies. The commanders established joint working groups on electronic warfare, air logisites, and remotely piloted vehicles. By 1976, an air-land forces application directorate began working seven problem areas including those mentioned above. Truly, a joint effort was underway to realize new efficiencies due to force structure drawdown concerns following the Vietnam War.

³⁷United States Air Force, Air Force Manual 1-1 <u>Volume II Basic Aerospace</u> <u>Doctrine of the United States Air Force</u>. Washington, DC: HQ, USAF. 1992, p. 83.

38Ibid.

³⁹Ibid, p. 79.

⁴⁰This is taken from an Air Force Times article written by Steven Watkins, an Air Force Times staff writer. It appeared in the issue during the week of 28 February to 4 March. Watkins writes that a new battle appears to be beginning on service roles and missions, and this is one of the Air Force's opening salvos.

⁴¹McPeak, Merrill A., Ideas Count. <u>Joint Force Quarterly</u>, Washington, DC: National Defense University, Summer 93, p 24.

⁴²Weigley, Russell F., The American Wav of War. A History of United States

Strategy and Policy, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973, p. 43.

43 Futrell, Volume I, p. 366.

⁴⁴United States Navy, <u>Force 2001 A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy</u>. Washington DC: HQ, USN, 1993, p. 4.

⁴⁵United States Navy, <u>From the Sea Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century</u>, Washington, DC: HQ, USN, 1992, p. 7.

46Tbid

47Ibid, p. 2.

⁴⁸United States Navy, <u>Force 2001 A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy</u>. Washington DC: HQ, USN, 1993, p. 4-6.

⁴⁹Ibid, p. 6.

⁵⁰United States Marine Corps, FMFM 1-1 <u>Warfighting</u>. Washington, DC: HQ, USMC, p. 54.

⁵¹lbid, This quote is found in the foreword which is in the form of a letter to the Marine Corps. It is additional guidance on the philosophy and distribution of the manual.

⁵²Weigley, Russell F., <u>Tie American Way of War. A History of United States</u>
<u>Strategy and Policy</u>. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973, pp. 254-255.

53 Ibid.

⁵⁴Howard, Michael, <u>The Theory and Practice of War</u>. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1965, p. 222.

⁵⁵Weigley, p. 254.

56]bid, pp. 259-260.

⁵⁷Howard, p. 222.

58Heinl, Robert O., Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps. 1775-1962. Baltimore, Maryland; The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991, Foreword.

⁵⁹From the Sea, p. 9.

60 Mundy, Carl E. Jr., Complementary Capabilities From the Sea. <u>Joint Force Operatorly</u>, Washington, DC: National Defense University, Summer 93, p. 21.

61 Clausowitz, p. 140.

62 Joint Pub 1, p. 2.

63Clausewitz, p. 140.

⁶⁴Field Manual 100-5, Operations, p. 1-2.

65Clauesewitz, p. 89.

66Futrell, Volume I, p.31.

⁶⁷Futrell, Volume I, p. 32. "On land, battle is determined by morale: The aim ...is to destroy morale by methods ...based on unchanging human nature. Naval warfare,...was a product of industrial and inventive genius firepower. Aircraft together with submarines, had the ability to destroy naval vessels, and it was obvious that the airplane had altered the means by which sea power was to be attained."

68Thid

⁶⁹Howard, Michael, <u>The Theory and Practice of War</u>. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1965, p. 215.

⁷⁰Simpson, Mitchell B., III, <u>The Development of Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski</u>. Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 1977, pp. x-xi.

⁷¹Huntington, Samuel P., <u>The Common Defense Strategic Programs in National Politics</u>. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1961, p. 403.

72United States Navy, Force 2001, p. 4.

73US Marine Corps, FMFM 1. Warfighting, p. 43.

⁷⁴Ibid, p. 19.

⁷⁵Association of the United States Army, <u>Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Its Impact on the Army</u>, Arlington, VA: AUSA, 1988, p. 1.

⁷⁶Ibid, p. 4.

⁷⁷This is taken from a briefing provided to the AMSP students during the East Coast trip taken in January, 1994. The J-7 provided a briefing on their roles, missions, and functions.

⁷⁸Ihid. This comes from one of the briefing slides depicting the definitions the J-7 has given to the terms Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.

⁷⁹Rosen, Stephen Peter, Service Redundancy: Waste or Hidden Capabilities, <u>Joint Force Quarterly</u>, Washington, DC: National Defense University, Summer 93, p. 37.

⁸⁰Cropsey, Seth, The Limits of Jointness, <u>Joint Force Quarterly</u>, Washington, DC: National Defense University, Summer 93, p. 73.

⁸¹Association of the United States Army, pp. 11-12.

82 Joint Pub 1, p. 45.

83Cropsey, Seth, p. 75.

84Rosen, Stephen Peter, p. 37.

⁸⁵Riscassi, Robert W., Principles for Coalition Warfare, <u>Joint Force Ouarterly</u>, Washington, DC: National Defense University, Summer 93, p. 59.

86Thid

87AFM 1-1, Volume 1, p. 9.

⁸⁸AFM 1-1, Volume II, p. 79.

⁸⁹Cropecy, Seth, p. 74.

90 Rosen, Stephen Peter, p. 39

⁹¹Riscassi, Robert W., p. 59. General Riscassi's article discusses principles for coalition warfare. He has a sound argument in this article about the failures of doctrine. As earlier stated in this monograph, he feels doctrine is based on historical personalities versus methods. I agree. While personality is clearly important and can, at times, be the dominant factor, it should not be the centerpiece for creating doctrine.

⁹²Mundy, Carl E., Complementary Capabilities Fro the Sea, <u>Joint Force Quarterly</u>, Washington, DC: National Defense University, Summer 93, p. 21.

⁹³Sullivan, Gordon R., Projecting Strategic Land Combat Power, <u>Joint Force Quarterly</u>, Washington, DC: National Defense University, Summer 93, p. 11.

⁹⁴Huntinton, Samuel, pp. 405-407. Huntington is describing the funtional areas espoused by the services during the 1950's. Truly this decade was atrying time for the services. Each competing for resources. The 1990's are no different. Also, the Navy's functional areas include the Marine Corps as well.

⁹⁵Joint Pub 1, p.3. General Powell also discusses this in his opening remarks in the professional journal Joint Force Quarterly. Although, General Shalishkavili has yet to establish his framework for warfighting, his initial tenure has been characterized along the same lines. That is, people in the military need to understand that no longer will we fight as separate services.

⁹⁶Jeremiah, David E., What's Ahead for the Armed Forces, <u>Joint Force Quarterly</u>, Washington, DC: National Defense University, Summer 93, p. 35.

⁹⁷Joint Pub 1, p. 5.

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